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	SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 10	COUN	TY OF MARIN
10		Case No. CIV 2200788
11	SOUTH ELISEO NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE, DIANA HEDRICK and	BRIEF OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY
12	MARK SCHULMAN, Petitioners,	GENERAL AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
13	v.	Data 0.4 1 - 10 2022
15	MARIN COUNTY COMMUNITY	Date: October 18, 2022 Time: 1:30 PM
15	DEVELOPMENT AGENCY and MARIN COUNTY BOARD OF	Dep't: A Judge: Hon. Stephan P. Freccero
10	SUPERVISORS,	Complaint Filed: March 23, 2022
17	Respondents,	
18	EPISCOPAL COMMUNITY SERVICES OF SAN FRANCISCO,	
20	Real Party in Interest.	
20	INTRODUCTION AND IN	<b>TERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE</b>
21		ant interest in the proper interpretation and
22		w at issue in this case, and in ensuring that funds
23		-
24		The Attorney General submits this brief as amicus
		nekey Program is a multi-billion dollar statewide
26 27	initiative to expand urgently needed housing	for people experiencing nomelessness. It
27	<sup>1</sup> Cf. Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.200(c)(7) (perr as of right in Court of Appeal).	nitting Attorney General to file amicus curiae brief
	Amicus Curiae Brief of the California Attorney Gene	1 ral Case No. CIV 2200788
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1 accomplishes this goal by providing funding to local public entities and their private sector 2 partners to acquire, rehabilitate, and convert existing residential and commercial properties into permanent or interim housing. The legislation creating the Homekey Program (1) included an 3 4 express statutory exemption from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review 5 process, and (2) excluded Homekey Program developments from the requirements of article XXXIV, section 1 of the California Constitution (Article 34). Petitioners' arguments are 6 7 contrary to the Legislature's intent in enacting the Homekey Program and would impede the 8 State's ability to effectively address the basic needs of hundreds of thousands of Californians 9 facing homelessness, including the highly vulnerable people with disabilities who would be 10 housed in the Larkspur development at issue here.

Petitioners argue that Health and Safety Code section 50675.1.4's CEQA exemption for the Homekey Program does not apply to the Larkspur development because it is designed to house individuals, not individuals *and* families. Petitioners also argue that because the property being converted to a Homekey development is a former skilled nursing facility—which, they contend, is not a dwelling unit or lodging facility—the development does not fall within the Article 34 exclusion and should therefore be subject to local voter approval requirements.

Petitioners are incorrect. The Legislature intended Homekey Program developments
designed for individuals—who are a majority of those experiencing homelessness—to be
exempt from CEQA review. Further, the Legislature inteded that the statutory exclusion of
Homekey Program projects from Article 34 requirements include all types of properties that are
rehabilitated or otherwise converted into dwelling units. The Court should reject Petitioners'
erroneous arguments.

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## DISCUSSION

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## I. The Homekey Program Was Enacted to Rapidly Expand Housing for Homeless People in Response to Acute Crises in California.

When the Legislature enacted the statutes creating the Homekey Program, California
was facing a growing homelessness crisis. In January 2020, 161,000 Californians were

1	experiencing homelessness. <sup>2</sup> From 2019 to 2020, California had the largest absolute increase in
2	homelessness and accounted for more than half of all unsheltered people in the United States; <sup>3</sup>
3	the homeless count rose in California by 42 percent between 2014 and 2020, while the rest of
4	the country saw a 9 percent decrease. <sup>4</sup>
5	Because of the demographics of those experiencing homelessness, permanent supportive
6	housing developments directed at individuals, such as the Larkspur development here, are
7	essential to a successful response to homelessness. Adults who are not living with children
8	make up 77 percent of the people experiencing homelessness in California. <sup>5</sup> Of the more than
9	248,000 people who accessed homelessness services in 2020, 41 percent reported disabling
10	conditions, <sup>6</sup> and mental illness is particularly prevalent:
11	Adults with severe mental illness constitute one of the largest subpopulations of hemalogs communities. The Treatment Advances Contra estimated in 2016 that as
12	homeless communities. The Treatment Advocacy Center estimated in 2016 that as many as 30 percent of people experiencing homelessness nationwide have serious
13	mental illnesses, and a more recent study conducted by the L.A. Times found that over 50 percent of those experiencing homelessness in Los Angeles County may be
14	experiencing symptoms of a mental disorder. <sup>7</sup>
15	Facing the urgent and intersecting issues of homelessness and the COVID-19 pandemic,
16	the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 83 in 2020 (AB 83). That bill created the Homekey
17	Program, which invested in long-term solutions to homelessness such as permanent housing and
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20	<sup>2</sup> U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Devel., <i>The 2020 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report</i> (AHAR) to Congress (2021) < <u>https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2020-</u>
21	$\frac{\text{AHAR-Part-1.pdf}}{\text{Ibid.}} > \text{(as of Sept. 22, 2022)}.$
22	<sup>4</sup> Streeter, <i>Homelessness in California: Causes and Policy Considerations</i> (May 2022) Stanford
23	Inst. for Econ. Pol'y Res. < <u>https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/homelessness-</u> <u>california-causes-and-policy-considerations</u> > (as of Sept. 22, 2022).
24	<sup>5</sup> Davalos and Kimberlin, Who is Experiencing Homelessness in California? (Feb. 2022)
25 26	< <u>https://calbudgetcenter.org/resources/who-is-experiencing-homelessness-in-california</u> > (as of Sept. 22, 2022).
26	<sup>6</sup> Ibid.
27	<sup>7</sup> Novasky & Rosales, Mental Health and Homelessness in the Wake of Covid-19: The Path to
28	Supportive and Affordable Housing (2020) 68 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 130, 132.
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1	relevant social services. <sup>8</sup> Homekey Program funding has exceeded \$3.75 billion for more than
2	200 projects statewide, creating 12,500 homes for people experiencing homelessness. <sup>9</sup>

3	About a year later, in 2021, the Governor signed Assembly Bill 140 (AB 140), which
4	provided the statutory basis for Round 2 of the Homekey Program at Health and Safety Code
5	sections 50675.1.3 and 50675.1.4 (Homekey Round 2). Homekey Round 2 allowed for funds
6	appropriated to provide housing for homeless individuals and families to be disbursed for the
7	"[a]cquisition or rehabilitation, or acquisition and rehabilitation, of motels, hotels, hostels, or
8	other sites and assets, including apartments or homes, adult residential facilities, residential care
9	facilities for the elderly, manufactured housing, commercial properties, and other buildings with
10	existing uses that could be converted to permanent or interim housing." (Health & Saf. Code, §
11	50675.1.3, subd. (b)(1).) Projects funded pursuant to Homekey Round 2 were exempted from
12	the CEQA review process so long as they met specified and applicable criteria. (Health & Saf.
13	Code, § 50675.1.4.) The Larkspur project was funded under Homekey Round 2.

## 14II. The Legislature Intended Homekey Program Developments that Provide15Housing Only for Homeless Individuals to Be Exempt from the CEQA Review

Process.

By enacting Health and Safety Code § 50675.1.4, the Legislature decided to avoid the burdens of environmental review for this class of projects. (See *Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 902, 909; see also *May v. City of Milpitas* (2013) 20 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1321 (listing "[s]tatutes other than CEQA [that] also provide statutory 21 exemptions to CEQA's requirements").) The Legislature may choose to partially or wholly 22 exempt projects and activities from CEQA review. (See *N. Coast Rivers Alliance v. Westlands* 

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 83 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., pp. 23–25.
<sup>9</sup> Off. of Gov. Gavin Newsom, *In Los Angeles, Governor Newsom Announces \$694 Million in Homekey Awards to Create More than [1]2,500 New Homeless Housing Units Statewide* (Aug. 24, 2022) <<u>https://www.gov.ca.gov/2022/08/24/in-los-angeles-governor-newsom-announces-694-million-in-homekey-awards-to-create-more-than-2500-new-homeless-housing-units-statewide/</u>> (as of Sept. 28, 2022).

*Water Dist.* (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 832, 850.) In such cases, the sole question is a matter of
 statutory interpretation, to determine the availability (or scope) of the exemption. (See Covina
 *Residents for Responsible Development v. City of Covina* (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 712, 724.)

Here, for a Homekey Program development to qualify for the statutory CEQA
exemption, one requirement is that it "provides housing units for individuals and families who
are experiencing homelessness or who are at risk of homelessness." (Health & Saf. Code, §
50675.1.4, subd. (a)(7).) Petitioners argue that the language of this exemption requires a project
to provide housing for *both* "individuals and families." They argue that it therefore does not
apply to the Larkspur permanent supportive housing project at issue here, because that project is
dedicated to housing for single adults with disabilities, not families. (Pet. Op. Br. p. 12.)

11 Petitioners are wrong. As Respondents note in their brief, "individuals and families who 12 are experiencing homelessness or who are at risk of homelessness" is a defined term in Health 13 and Safety Code section 50675.1.3, the provision that specifies uses and priorities for allocation 14 of Homekey Program funds. (Resp. Opp. Br. pp. 7-8; Health & Saf. Code, § 50675.1.3, subd. 15 (1)). The statutory definition incorporates a federal regulation that repeatedly employs the 16 phrase "individual or family" in its definitions of "homeless" and "at risk of homelessness." 17 (Ibid.; 24 C.F.R. § 578.3.) Section 50675.1.4 provides a CEQA exemption for projects "funded 18 pursuant to Section 50675.1.3," and nothing suggests that the Legislature intended "individuals 19 and families who are experiencing homelessness or who are at risk of homelessness" to have a 20 different meaning in section 50675.1.4 than it does in section 50675.1.3. (See People v. Jones 21 (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 595 ["It is presumed, in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, that a repeated phrase or word in a statute is used in the same sense throughout" 22 23 (cleaned up)].) The Court must follow the unambiguous statutory definition. And as 24 Respondents also convincingly demonstrate, the legislative history of the Homekey Program 25 confirms that the Legislature was focused on aiding homeless individuals, not solely families. 26 (Resp. Opp. Br. p. 8.)

27 Petitioners' argument rests solely on the word "and" in isolation. But courts recognize
28 that in everyday language, the word "and" is often used as a "careless substitute" for the word

"or." (*People v. Horn* (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1028.) "Consequently the word 'and' may
sometimes be interpreted as 'or' to carry out the intention of the Legislature in drafting a
statute" (*ibid.* [cleaned up]), which is the "fundamental task" of statutory interpretation.
(*People v. Murphy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) Courts do not consider statutory language in
isolation. Instead, they "look to the entire substance of the statute," construing the words "in
context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute." (*Ibid.* [cleaned up].)

7 Here, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to limit CEQA exemptions under 8 section 50675.1.4 solely to projects that provide housing for both individuals and families 9 simultaneously. First, the overall purpose of the Homekey Program is to provide housing for 10 people experiencing, or at risk of, homelessness. As discussed above, a significant majority of that population is individuals,<sup>10</sup> many with disabilities,<sup>11</sup> and nothing in the statute suggests that 11 12 the Legislature intended to give the smaller group of families experiencing homelessness special 13 preference over individuals. An interpretation excluding projects dedicated to the largest segment of the homeless population from the exemption would be inconsistent with the statute's 14 15 purpose to speed the development of housing for people experiencing homelessness by exempting qualified Homekey Program-funded projects from CEQA. 16

17 The larger statutory context confirms this interpretation. Since section 50675.1.3 uses 18 the phrase "individuals and families who are experiencing homelessness or who are at risk of 19 homelessness" to describe Homekey Program funds, accepting Petitioners' construction of 20 "individuals and families" would not only exclude projects dedicated to single individuals from 21 the CEQA exemption, it would throw into question their eligibility for Homekey Program 22 funding entirely. This demonstrates still further the fundamental inconsistency of Petitioners' 23 interpretation with the Legislature's intent to benefit the entire population of people 24 experiencing homelessness.

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<sup>26 &</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In January 2020, 70 percent of California's homeless population were individuals. See *2020 AHAR*, *supra* note 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>
<sup>11</sup> Of the Californians who accessed homeless services in 2020, 41 percent reported disabilities.
<sup>28</sup> See 2022 Who is Experiencing Homelessness in California?, supra note 5.

Another provision of AB 140 provides yet more support for this reading. The Homekey 1 2 Program sets aside 8 percent of funds for "projects serving homeless youth, or youth at risk of homelessness." (Health & Saf. Code, § 50675.1.3, subd. (c).) Since homeless youth are 3 4 understood to be "unaccompanied minors ages 12 through 17 who are living apart from their 5 parents or legal guardians, and young adults ages 18 through 24 who are economically and/or emotionally detached from their families,"<sup>12</sup> and thus living as individuals rather than in family 6 7 units, the Legislature's set-aside of funds for projects specifically serving this group shows 8 further that it did not intend to exclude projects dedicated to housing for individuals from 9 Homekey Program funds, or from section 50675.1.4's CEQA exemption.

## 10 III. The Legislature Intended that Homekey Program Developments Be Excluded 11 from Article 34's Local Voter Approval Requirements.

12 As Respondents argue, Petitioner's Article 34 argument is barred by their failure to 13 exhaust their administrative remedies. (Resp. Opp. Br. p. 17.) But if the Court reaches the substance of the argument, the requirements of Article 34 do not apply to the Larkspur project 14 15 because the Legislature included a statutory exclusion from Article 34 in AB 140-the same legislation that established Homekey Round 2. (Health & Saf. Code, § 37001, subd. (h)(2), (5).) 16 17 This statutory provision was intended to exclude projects funded under Homekey Round 2, such as the Larkspur project, from the application of Article 34. Any interpretation to the contrary 18 19 disregards the express language of the statute.

Article 34 requires local voter approval before a "low rent housing project" can be "developed, constructed, or acquired" by a "state public body." (Cal. Const., art. XXXIV, § 1.) In 1976, the Legislature adopted the Public Housing Election Implementation Law (PHEIL) (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 37000–37002), which clarified several provisions of Article 34; among other things, these clarifications operate to exclude certain types of projects from Article 34. (See *Cal. Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 171, 175 [deferring to Legislature's interpretation in the PHEIL that Article 34's "low rent housing project" provision

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>
 <sup>12</sup> Assem. Com. on Approps., Rep. on Sen. Bill 177 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 5, 2013 p. 2.

1	excluded certain types of development].)
2	In 2021 (and pursuant to AB 140), the Legislature amended Health and Safety Code
3	section 37001 to exclude developments from the application of Article 34 if they:
4	consist[] of the acquisition, rehabilitation, reconstruction, alterations work, new construction, or any combination thereof, of lodging facilities or dwelling units using
5 6	the following: [¶] Moneys received from the Coronavirus State Fiscal Recovery Fund established by the federal American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) (Public
7	Law 117-2) [¶] Moneys appropriated and disbursed to fund the uses and accomplish the objectives specified in Section 50675.1.1 or 50675.1.3.
8	(Health & Saf. Code, § 37001, subd. (h)(2), (5).) <sup>13</sup> Notably, "any combination" of the listed
9	development activities is allowed under this exclusion, so long as the development is a lodging
10	facility or dwelling unit that is funded with ARPA money (Health & Saf. Code, § 37001, subd.
11	(h)(2)), or uses moneys appropriated and disbursed to fund the uses and accomplish the
12	objectives specified in Section 50675.1.1 or 50675.1.3 (id., § 37001, subd. (h)(5)).
13	Petitioners' argument that the Larkspur project does not fall within this Article 34
14	statutory exclusion mistakenly assumes that the exclusion only applies based on the <i>former</i> use
15	of the property. According to Petitioners, because the project occupies the site of a former
16	skilled nursing facility, it does not involve the acquisition and rehabilitation of properties that
17	were <i>previously</i> lodging facilities or dwelling units, and thus does not fall within the scope of
18	section 37001, subdivision (h). (Pet. Op. Br. p. 22.)
19	Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history supports this cramped reading
20	of the statute. Here, the express language of the (h)(2) statutory exclusion applies to
21	developments, like the Larkspur project, comprised of lodging facilities or dwelling units that
22	$\frac{1}{1^{3}}$ Health and Safety Code section 50675.1.3 states that funds appropriated to provide housing for
23	those who are experiencing homelessness or who are at risk of homelessness, and who are
24	inherently impacted by or at increased risk for medical diseases or conditions due to the COVID- 19 pandemic or other communicable diseases, "shall be disbursed in accordance with the
25	Multifamily Housing Program" for the conversion of nonresidential to residential units, as well as for the acquisition and/or rehabilitation of "motels, hotels, hostels, or other sites and assets,
26	including apartments or homes, adult residential facilities, residential care facilities for the elderly, manufactured housing, commercial properties, and other buildings with existing uses
27	that could be converted to permanent or interim housing." (Health & Saf. Code, § 50675.1.3,
28	subd. (a), (a)(1).)
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1	are being newly constructed or reconstructed using ARPA funds. <sup>14</sup> The Larkspur project
2	likewise falls within the Legislature's catch-all (h)(5) statutory exclusion because the
3	development comprises lodging facilities or dwelling units that are being constructed or
4	reconstructed using "[m]oneys appropriated and disbursed to fund the uses and accomplish the
5	objectives specified in Section 50675.1.1 or 50675.1.3." (Health & Saf. Code, § 37001, subd.
6	(h)(5).) As noted, section 50675.1.1 defines the scope of Homekey Round 1, while section
7	50675.1.3 defines the scope of Homekey Round 2. The effect of the (h)(5) exclusion is
8	therefore to exclude any permissible use under Homekey Rounds 1 and 2 from Article 34's
9	requirements. As a Homekey Round 2 project, the Larkspur project thus falls within the (h)(5)
10	statutory exclusion, regardless of the prior use of the property. As in the case with subdivision
11	(h)(2), the project site's former use as a skilled nursing facility is simply immaterial to the
12	question of Article 34 applicability.
13	For all these reasons, the Larkspur project does not constitute a low rent housing project
14	within the meaning of Article 34.
15	IV. CONCLUSION
16	The Petition for Writ of Mandamus should be denied.
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18	Dated: October 10, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
19	ROB BONTA
20	Attorney General of California MICHAEL L. NEWMAN
21	Senior Assistant Attorney General JAMES F. ZAHRADKA II
22	Supervising Deputy Attorney General ALEXANDER PRIETO
23	Deputy Attorney General
24	
25	D. DON SHIN Deputy Attorney General
26	Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of
27	California
28	<sup>14</sup> Funding for Homekey Round 2 was derived almost entirely from ARPA funds.
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